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Abstract—In this paper we derive a key rate expres-
sion for the extended version of the B92 quantum key
distribution protocol that takes into account, for the first
time, the effects of operating with finite resources. With
this expression, we conduct an analysis of the protocol in
a variety of different noise and key-length settings, and
compare to previous bounds on comparable protocols.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum Key Distribution is becoming an increas-
ingly practically driven field of research [1] [2]. As
advances in this and other fields make commercial
implementations of QKD devices more desirable, it is
necessary that more work is done to understand the ca-
pabilities and limitations of these protocols in practice, as
opposed to under ideal circumstances. The B92 protocol
[3] has been well researched in the asymptotic setting,
where it has been shown to be tolerant to up to 6.5%
noise in the channel [4]. An extended variant of B92 was
proposed [5], in which, in addition to the two encoding,
non-orthogonal states used in B92, Alice and Bob utilize
two additional non-encoding, non-orthogonal states to
achieve a tighter bound on Eve’s information. Analysis
of the extended B92 protocol has shown it to be tolerant
to up to 11% noise in the asymptotic setting [5]. In this
paper we will present what is, to our knowledge, the first
analysis of the key rate for the extended B92 protocol
in the finite key setting.
Our contributions are as follows: first, we conduct
an information theoretic security analysis, assuming a
collective attack, to evaluate the key rate of extended
B92 in the finite key setting. We use our analysis to
rigorously evaluate lower bounds on the key rate and
noise tolerance of the protocol in a variety of different
channel settings. We note that although we evaluate on
depolarization channels, the equations we give hold for
arbitrary channels. We will discuss general trends in the
optimizing choices of protocol parameters, and, finally,
we will compare our findings to the performance of other
comparable protocols in the finite key setting.
A. Notation
Let A be a random variable, we will denote by H(A)
the Shannon entropy of A. We will use both H(p) and
h(p) to refer to the binary entropy function, and they
should both be understood to be equal to H(p, 1− p).
Given a pure state |ψ〉A ∈ HA we will use both [ψ]A
and P (|ψ〉)A to mean |ψ〉 〈ψ|A, and if the context is
clear we will often drop the subscript. Given a density
operator ρAB we will write ρB to mean the state obtained
by taking the partial trace over the A system of ρAB .
By a classical quantum or CQ state, we will mean a
quantum state that can be described by some ρAB =∑
a pa[a]⊗ ρ(a)B for an orthonormal basis {|a〉}.
Given a density operator ρA acting on HA, we will
mean by S(A)ρ the von-Neumann entropy of ρA, equiv-
alent to −tr(ρAlogρA), where here and elsewhere in
this paper log is base 2 unless otherwise stated. We
will mean by S(A|B)ρ the von-Neumann entropy of the
A register of ρ conditioned on the B register, where
S(A|B)ρ = S(AB)ρ − S(B)ρ. Again, if the context is
clear, we may drop the subscript.
Later we will evaluate key rates in a number of
channel scenarios, all symmetric channels, by which we
mean that the channel, parameterized by quantum noise
level Q, can be described by the depolarization channel
EQ(ρ) 7→ (1− 2Q)ρ+QI. (1)
In this work we build towards finding a lower bound
of the key rate for the extended B92 protocol. To do
this, we make use of the key rate equation, Equation 2,
presented in [6], which states that in the finite realm,
the key rate, r′, of a protocol, under collective attacks,
can be calculated as below. We note that as we utilize
a different sampling method than was used in [6], we
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must utilize a larger confidence interval than was used
in [6]. Our confidence interval, Equation 4, is derived
from Hoeffding’s inequality. In [6] it was shown that for
a protocol that has run for N rounds, and resulted in
n ≤ N raw key bits, the key rate r′, can be computed
to be
r′ =
l(n)
n
= Sξ(A|E)− (leakEC −∆) /n, (2)
where
Sξ(A|E) = min
σA¯E¯∈Γ
S(A¯|E¯)σ, (3)
with Γ consisting of all σ which we could expect to
induce statistics that differ by no more than ξ(mi),
except with some probability PE > 0, for any of
{pi}ki=1 statistics, each gathered over mi samples, for:
ξ(m) =
√
ln
(
2/
(
1− k√1− PE
))
2m
, (4)
where we take leakEC as the number of bits leaked
due to error correction of n raw key bits for a given
quantum bit error rate; ∆ = 2log2(1/[− − EC)]) +
7
√
nlog2(2/(− ′EC) are bits lost due to finite key ef-
fects; , EC are user parameters that denote the security
parameter of the key and the failure probability of error
correction respectively; and , PE , obeying constraints
 − EC >  > PE ≥ 0, can be be chosen so as to
maximize the key rate.
To evaluate the von-Neumann entropy in Equation 3,
we will additionally make use of the following theorem:
Theorem 1. (From [7]): Let ρAE be a CQ state acting
on HA ⊗HE that can be written as
ρAE =
1
M
(
[0]A ⊗
1∑
i=0
[gi0]E + [1]A ⊗
1∑
i=0
[gi1]E
)
.
(5)
Then
S(A|E) ≥
1∑
i=0
( 〈gi0|gi0〉+ 〈g1i|g1i〉
N
)
Si
Si =
{
Si = h
( 〈gi0|gi0〉
〈gi0|gi0〉+〈gi1|gi1〉
)
− h(λi) 〈g
i
0|gi0〉>0,
〈gi1|gi1〉>0
Si = 0 else
where
λi =
1
2
+
√(〈gi0|gi0〉+ 〈gi1|gi1〉)2 + 4Re2 〈gi0|gi1〉
2
(〈gi0|gi0〉+ 〈gi1|gi1〉)
II. THE PROTOCOL AND KEY-RATE COMPUTATION
The protocol we analyze is actually a simplified
version of the Extended B92 protocol that operates as
follows. Alice and Bob utilize the bases Z = {|0〉 , |1〉}
and A = {|α〉 , |α〉} where |α〉 = α |0〉 + β|1〉 and
|α〉 = β |0〉 − α |1〉, 0 < α < 1 is a publicly known
parameter of the protocol, and β =
√
(1− α2). On an
iteration of the protocol, with probability Penc, also a
parameter, this round is a key round, and Alice randomly
prepares and transmits either the state |0〉 or |α〉 to Bob.
Otherwise, with probability (1 − Penc) she sends state
|1〉. Bob chooses to measure his received state in the
Z or A basis with equal probability. At the end of a
round, Alice notifies Bob if the round was a key round,
and, if Bob measured either |α〉 or |1〉, Bob notifies
Alice that the round was conclusive, otherwise that it was
inconclusive. On a conclusive key round, Alice’s key bit
is 0 if she sent |0〉 and 1 if she sent |α〉, and Bob’s key
bit is 0 if he measured |α〉, and 1 if he measured |1〉. If
a round is not conclusive, or not a key round, the results
are used for channel tomography.
Following N rounds of this protocol, Alice and Bob
will share a correlated but noisy raw key string of length
n < N , as well as m < N − n samples that we will
show can be used to estimate various channel statics,
obtained from rounds that did not contribute to the
key. At this point Alice and Bob follow standard post
processing procedures, conducting error correction and
privacy amplification to distill an l(n) bit secret key [1]
[2].
In this section we model the state of the system at
the end of a key round so that we may find a lower
bound on S(A|E), as is necessary to compute the key
rate. To accomplish this, we also discuss how to estimate
the parameters of Eve’s attack with statistics that are
observed during the course of the protocol, as well as
how to calculate the confidence interval that must be
minimized over for each of those statistics in the finite
case.
A. Bounding the Conditional Entropy
To bound the quantity S(A|E) we must first compute
a density operator for the system at the end of a key
round. Because we are considering collective attacks,
Eve’s attack can be modeled by unitary operator U ,
acting on a qubit and her ancillary space, initialized as
|χE〉, as follows:
U |0, χE〉 7→ |0, e0〉+ |1, e1〉 ,
U |1, χE〉 7→ |0, e2〉+ |1, e3〉 .
For ease of notation we will make explcit the action
U |α, χE〉 7→ |α, f0〉+ |α, f1〉 where
|f0〉 = α2 |e0〉+ αβ |e2〉+ αβ |e1〉+ β2 |e3〉 , (6)
|f1〉 = αβ |e0〉+ β2 |e2〉 − α2 |e1〉 − αβ |e3〉 . (7)
As we are interested in the entropy of Alice’s key,
we condition on this round of the protocol being a
key round. In which case Alice begins the protocol by
preparing the transit space HT as either |0〉 or |α〉,
sending it into the channel, and storing her key bit in the
register HA. Eve attacks with U acting on HT ⊗ HE ,
resulting in the joint state:
ρATE =
1
2
[0]A ⊗ P (|0, e0〉+ |1, e1〉)TE
+
1
2
[1]A ⊗ P (|α, f0〉+ |α, f1〉)TE .
Bob now chooses to make a measurement of HT in
either the Z or A basis, each with equal probability.
Again conditioning on this round being a key round,
he observes either |1〉 or |α〉, corresponding to his key
register HB being set as 1 or 0 respectively. Tracing
out the spaces HT and HB after we condition on a
conclusive measurement, we are left with:
ρAE =
1
M
[0]A ⊗ (P (|e1〉) + P (β |e0〉 − α |e1〉))E
+
1
M
[1]A ⊗ (P (|f1〉) + P (β |f0〉 − α |f1〉))E ,
where M is a normalization term we will define shortly.
In accordance with Theorem 1, we can then represent
this state in the form given in Equation 5, with:
M =
1∑
i=0
〈gi0|gi0〉+ 〈gi1|gi1〉 , (8)
|g00〉 = |e1〉 , (9)
|g10〉 = β |e0〉 − α |e1〉 , (10)
|g01〉 = |f1〉 , (11)
|g11〉 = β |f0〉 − α |f1〉 = α |e1〉+ β |e3〉 . (12)
B. Parameter Estimation
With an operator determined it remains to estimate
the various inner products of Eve’s states as functions
of the observable statistics we gather. It is trivial to find
the following identities based on Eve’s attack operator:
〈e0|e0〉 = P00, 〈e1|e1〉 = P01,
〈e2|e2〉 = P10, 〈e3|e3〉 = P11.
Where Pij denotes the probability of Bob measuring |j〉
after Eve’s attack, conditioned on Alice sending the state
|i〉.
Next we consider the information that can be gained
by gathering mismatched statistics [7] [8] [9], gathered
from rounds in which Alice and Bob chose to prepare
and measure states in mismatched bases. For example,
by computing the probability P0α we are able to compute
the quantity Re 〈e0|e1〉. Indeed, tracing the evolution of
the qubit in that case, we find:
|0〉 7→ |0, e0〉+ |1, e1〉
= |α〉 ⊗ (α |e0〉+ β |e1〉)+
|α〉 ⊗ (β |e0〉+ α |e1〉)
=⇒ P0α =α2 〈e0|e0〉+ β2 〈e1|e1〉
+ 2αβRe 〈e0|e1〉
=⇒ Re 〈e0|e1〉 = P0α − α
2 〈e0|e0〉 − β2 〈e1|e1〉
2αβ
.
(13)
Similarly we can also find:
Re 〈e2|e3〉 = P1α − α
2 〈e2|e2〉 − β2 〈e3|e3〉
2αβ
, (14)
Re 〈e0|e2〉 = Pα0 − α
2 〈e0|e0〉 − β2 〈e2|e2〉
2αβ
, (15)
Re 〈e1|e3〉 = Pα1 − α
2 〈e1|e1〉 − β2 〈e3|e3〉
2αβ
. (16)
Through much the same method, utilizing the states
given in Equations 6 and 15, we are able to find the
following identity using Pαα.
2α2β2Re (〈e0|e3〉+ 〈e1|e2〉) =
α2β2 (〈e0|e0〉+ 〈e3|e3〉) +
β4 〈e2|e2〉+ α4 〈e1|e1〉+
2α3βRe (〈e1|e3〉 − 〈e0|e1〉) +
2αβ3Re (〈e0|e2〉 − 〈e2|e3〉)− Pαα. (17)
With the last of our identities described, we can now
apply Theorem 1 to find a lower bound on the entropy
of Eve’s system to be:
S(A|E) ≥
1∑
i=0
(
E0[i] + E1[i]
N
)
Si (18)
Si =
{
Si = h
(
E0[i]
E0[i]+E1[i]
)
− h(λi) if E0[i]>0and E1[i]>0
Si = 0 else
where A[i] denotes indexing into any of the ordered sets
A given below, and
λi =
1
2
+
√
(E0[i] + E1[i])
2
+ 4Re2Λ[i]
2 (E0[i] + E1[i])
,
E0 = {〈g00 |g00〉 , 〈g10 |g10〉} = {P01, 1− P0α}, (19)
E1 = {〈g01 |g01〉 , 〈g11 |g11〉} = {Pα,α, 1− Pα0}, (20)
Λ = {〈g00 |g01〉 , 〈g10 |g11〉},
Λ[0] = αβRe (〈e0|e1〉+ 〈e1|e3〉)− α2 〈e1|e1〉
+ β2Re 〈e1|e2〉 , (21)
Λ[1] = αβRe (〈e0|e1〉+ 〈e1|e3〉)− α2 〈e1|e1〉
+ β2Re 〈e0|e3〉 . (22)
We note that all of the inner products above, with
the exception of 〈e1|e2〉 in Equation 21, can be esti-
mated by the statistics gathered in this protocol, either
having been made explicit in earlier discussion or, in
the case of Equations 19 and 20, can be computed
to be as we claim by further tracing of the evolu-
tion of the state. We can now compute the bound
given in 18 by minimizing over the sole free variable,
which itself can be bounded by Cauchy-Schwartz as
〈e1|e2〉 ∈
[
−√〈e1|e1〉 〈e2|e2〉,√〈e1|e1〉 〈e2|e2〉] , with
〈e0|e3〉 obtained by Equation 17.
C. Finite Key Effects
To calculate the key rate in the finite case, we must
account for uncertainty in our observed statistics, and
consider all possible attacks Eve may have used that
induce statistics within the relevant confidence interval,
as given by Equation 4. Let each statistic Pij have been
sampled over Cij samples, then, following the work done
in [6], we find that to calculate a worst case bound
on Eve’s information we must further minimize the
entropy expression given in Equation 18, now replacing
all observed Pij used in parameter estimation with
Pˆij ∈ (Pij − ξ(Cij), Pij + ξ(Cij)),
save for Pˆ00, Pˆ11, and ˆPα1 which we take to be equal
to 1 − Pˆ01, 1 − Pˆ10, and 1 − ˆPα0 respectively. This
minimization results in a new worst case bound on Eve’s
uncertainty, correct with probability 1− PE , which we
denote Sξ(A|E).
With Sξ(A|E), we can now calculate the finite key-
length rate, r′ with Equation 2, with the constraints
discussed with Equation 2, though, for our purposes, are
more concerned with evaluating the effective key rate,
r =
r′n
N
, (23)
rather than the key rate itself, where n is the number of
raw key bits.
III. EVALUATION
With a key rate equation finalized, we now consider
the key rates that are realizable at various noise and and
signal size scenarios. We consider a symmetric channel,
as defined in Equation 1 parameterized on quantum
noise level Q, though we note the equations we have
derived thus far hold for arbitrary channels. We calculate
the expected number of samples Cij that contribute to
statistic Pij , for a given α and Penc over N rounds
below:
C01 = Cαα =
PencQ
4
N,
C10 =
(1− Penc)Q
2
N,
C0α = Cα0 =
Penc(Q+ (1− 2Q)α2)
4
N,
C1α =
(1− Penc)(Q+ (1− 2Q)(1− α2))
2
N,
Ck =
Penc(Q+ (1− 2Q)(1− α2))
2
N,
where we use Ck to denote the number of samples
that contribute to the raw key. We also note that in
practice these values would be observed, and we utilize
these expressions only to calculate what they might be
expected to be for the purposes of our evaluation.
We will conduct our analysis with leakEC =
1.2h(QBER) to account for practical inefficiencies in
error correction protocols, where QBER is the error rate
of the raw key string, for which we will use a worst case
upper bound of:
QBER ≤ P01 + ξ(C01) + Pαα + ξ(Cαα)
pacc
, (24)
where
pacc = P01 + ξ(C01) + Pαα + ξ(Cαα)
+ 2− (P0α + ξ(C0α) + Pα1 + ξ(Cα1)).
Further, in our analysis, we fix the user parameters
 = 1 × 10−9 and EC = 1 × 10−10. Additionally,
we fix the optimizable parameters ¯ = 8 × 10−10 and
PE = 7 × 10−10. Finally, we numerically optimized
over α and Penc in each case to find an optimal effective
key rate in various noise level and signal number.
In Figure 1 we show the optimal effective key rate at
various noise levels, increasing with N , appearing to
numerically approach the asymptotic bound (not shown)
Fig. 1. This figure depicts the effective key rate, optimized over α
and Penc for quantum noise levels Q ∈ {.01, .03, .05} and evaluated
at N = 1× 10n and N = 5× 10n for n ∈ {6, 7, 8, 9}.
Fig. 2. This figure depicts the effective key rate, optimized over α
and Penc for various N , as well as the asymptotic case (the top line),
as noise in the channel increases.
Fig. 3. This chart shows effective key rate as α varies for a fixed
Penc = .8 at noise level Q = .02 for various N . We found that while
in the asymptotic case, the optimal α approaches 0 as shown in [5],
while in the finite case there is an advantage in optimizing over α (and
indeed over Penc) in each scenario.
at each noise level. In Figure 2, we show the effective
key rate for various N as noise increases, where we can
see an increasing effective key rate and noise tolerance
as N increases, again approaching the asymptotic bound.
In our analysis, we observed that the values of α
and Penc that led to the optimal key rate (Equation 2)
did not necessarily result in the optimal effective key
rate. Additionally we observed that, as N increased, the
optimal α decreased while the optimal Penc increased,
approaching the asymptotic optimal values of 0 and 1
respectively [5], as one might expect. Further, we found
that for a given Penc, the key rate varied with α as shown
by the curves in Figure 3, reaching no more than one
positive maximum.
As this is the first analysis of extended B92 in the
finite setting, we instead compare our results to the per-
formance of standard B92 and BB84 in finite settings. As
one might expect, our analysis shows that the extended
variant of B92, which utilizes additional quantum states
to better bound S(A|E), results in higher noise tolerance
and effective key rates in the finite setting than can be
obtained with standard B92. Indeed, in [10], a recent
analysis showed that with 108 signals, standard B92
achieves a positive key rate up to at least 6.4% noise
while our analysis shows that extended B92 has a noise
tolerance of at least 7%. Conversely, while the work done
in [6] shows that at 5% noise BB84 can achieve positive
key rates with as few as 105 signals, we do not achieve
positive rates at that noise until 108 signals.
IV. CLOSING REMARKS
In this work we have conducted, for the first time, a
rigorous, information theoretic finite key-length analysis
of a simplified version of the extended B92 protocol. We
have bounded the key rate, under collective attacks, for
arbitrary channels, and evaluated that bound in various
noise scenarios under a symmetric channel. We have
shown that the key rate can be improved by optimizing
over Penc and α, and noted that the optimal choices for
those parameters obey interesting trends.
Future areas of interest in this area include refactoring
this analysis to utilize a single POVM for gathering
statistics, so as to obtain a tighter confidence interval
in Equation 4 as was done in [6]. Further, it may be
possible to achieve higher key rates with a tighter bound
on QBER than was given in Equation 24. An analysis of
achievable key rates and optimal choices under arbitrary
channels may also lead to interesting results, as would
an investigation of where optimal values for ¯ and EC
lie, which we held fixed in our optimization.
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